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
# Dan Smoot Report

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DAN SMOOT

## FROM TEHERAN TO PARIS

In a speech to the Rockland County (New York) Republican organization on June 4, 1960, President Eisenhower, according to the Associated Press, "surprised his GOP audience" by "hitting back" at Nikita Khrushchev.

Certainly, the President has had ample provocation.

During the first year of Eisenhower's administration, Khrushchev, coming to power in Russia, needed the respectability and prestige (both at home and abroad) which a personal meeting with the American President would give him. Khrushchev demanded a summit meeting with President Eisenhower.

This demand followed upon the heels of our 1952 Presidential election in which Republicans had won office, in part, because they had denounced Democrats for going to summit conferences with communist dictators.

Negotiations with communist dictators always lead to disaster because, to communists, negotiation has never been, and never will be, an attempt to settle disputes by finding a common ground of agreement. To communists, negotiation is merely another weapon of war. They do not go to conferences with intent to give a little and take a little. Communists just take, and hold on to what they take, using it as a pretext for taking more.

Actually, *any* negotiation by heads-of-government at a 'summit' conference is dangerous diplomacy.

In conventional diplomacy, negotiations are conducted by subordinates who have been selected because they are specialists on the issues at stake. They have had years of education and training and months of careful preparation for the discussions at hand. Their negotiations are not conducted under the klieg lights of worldwide publicity. Every sharp word spoken is not broadcast around the world to create tensions and fears of war.

If one side makes unreasonable demands, negotiators for the other side—being subordinates—

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are not expected to give immediate answers. If they cannot resolve the matter, they must consult the government back home for further instructions. This gives time for study and reflection and counter-offers. Inasmuch as details of the negotiations are kept from public view, one side can modify its demands without losing face.

But when heads-of-government negotiate in the glare of publicity, every disagreement creates world tensions. Confronted with an unexpected demand, a head-of-government would lose prestige if he said he lacked authority to decide. He *must* make an immediate decision, with the eyes of the world upon him, although he may be totally ignorant of the issues at stake. If he rejects the demands of the other side, he creates a dangerous world crisis. If he accedes to the demands, he may later learn that he has made a frightfully wrong decision. Nonetheless his nation must "stand unified behind him" in his wrong decision, else the nation loses face.

In 1953 (after Stalin's death), when the new Kremlin dictators demanded a summit conference as a means of strengthening their own position, the Republican administration refused. But by 1955, something had moved President Eisenhower to reject the lessons of history: he went to the summit conference at Geneva. A few days of universally publicized toast-drinking and grinning amiability between our President and the Kremlin rulers; our President's promise that he would not use nuclear weapons against the Soviets; our acceptance of Soviet demands for a formal "cultural exchange" program — all of this helped strengthen the new Kremlin tyrants for a bloody three-year period of internal purges and suppression of revolt in satellite states like Hungary.

By mid-1958, Khrushchev was again ready to show the world that he could make the American President dance to his tune. At first, President Eisenhower hemmed and hawed a bit; but, in 1959, he invited Khrushchev to the United States as an honored guest and accepted Khrushchev's invitation for a return visit to Russia, plus another summit conference at Paris in 1960.

What happened at Paris in the spring of 1960 is still so green in the memory of Americans that details need not be related. The capture of an American reconnaissance plane over Russia had nothing to do with Khrushchev's behavior at Paris. If the stupid fumbling of that incident (on the part of our State Department, acting under direct orders of President Eisenhower) had not given Khrushchev a pretext, he would have found or fabricated another. Khrushchev got what he wanted when he made his triumphal tour of America in 1959 and captured world headlines by showing how readily the President of the United States accepted his invitations for personal visits and formal conferences.

This set the stage for Paris in May, 1960, when the noisiest boar in the Soviet pigpen returned the courtesy of an American President's foolish hospitality and gestures of goodwill by humiliating the man publicly.

Khrushchev called our President everything from a malicious liar to an ignorant buffoon.

With this background in mind, it is surprising that the "GOP audience" in Rockland County New York should have been "surprised," as the Associated Press said, by Eisenhower's "hitting back" at Khrushchev in his June 4 speech.

How hard did the President 'hit back'? Why, he accused Khrushchev of having made 'ill-tempered expressions.'

From that mild understatement (which is typical of all Eisenhower public criticism of Soviet leaders), the President went on to find good in everything. Mr. Eisenhower said that Khrushchev's 'ill-tempered expressions' had 'forged a stronger Western alliance.'

To an American who has pride in country, the most humiliating consequence of Khrushchev's Paris performance was the resulting worldwide feeling of *pity* for the President of the United States. The public demonstrations for Eisenhower after he left Paris; the pleas of American columnists and broadcasters and editors for "I-like-Ike" expressions from the people — none of this in-

icated respect for a statesman or admiration for a great and commanding presence: it merely revealed that the world felt sorry for the President of the United States!

**B**ut the President seems content to be a pitiful spectacle. For the past eight years he has tried frantically and expensively, and in vain, to forge some kind of alliance with somebody, to protect the United States against something or other. Failure has never once slowed him down. He, and all the other political blacksmiths in Washington (both Democrats and Republicans), who set policies for the American people and confiscate their earnings to pay for the policies, have kept hammering away, supremely confident that American taxpayers could and would pay for any amount of fruitless effort to 'forge a stronger western alliance.'

Now, the President seems happy in the belief that Khrushchev has done for us what all of our own costly effort has failed to do: Khrushchev has 'forged a stronger western alliance.'

**F**eeling secure in the belief, the President said (in his June 4, speech):

"No nation in this world dares attack the United States, and they know it!"

**D**oes the President think we are stronger now when the world pities us than we were years ago when we were the object of admiration for all men everywhere? If so—if he really thinks we are now invincible, as he says—why did he say, in the same speech, "we must make certain that the nation's allies stand always by our side"?

And why, a few days later, did he say he wished American taxpayers would quit 'whimpering' about having to pay for foreign aid?

## American Foreign Policy

**K**hrushchev's behavior at Paris in May, 1960, would have been most beneficial to America if

our political leaders were capable of learning the right lesson from it; namely, that American foreign policy since 1933 has been grievously detrimental to our national interests.

This policy is founded on two major assumptions. One is that America cannot stand alone (as George Washington recommended and as we did stand alone for the first 125 years of our national life), a proud and independent nation, with a minimum of governmental restraint upon the foreign traveling and trading of our citizens, but with no political entanglements in the wars and other affairs of foreign nations. Roosevelt assumed that America must have a hand in the affairs of all other nations; that whenever wars erupted, America must choose sides and fight on the side of "our friends" lest our "friends" lose and leave us unprotected.

The second major assumption of American foreign policy since 1933 is that we "can handle" communist dictators if we prove our good will by giving them everything they want and asking nothing in return.

**T**hese two assumptions were Franklin D. Roosevelt's. The foreign policy built on them — and supported by both Republican and Democrat parties — was faithfully continued by Truman and amplified by Eisenhower. In fact, there is more similarity between Roosevelt and Eisenhower in the conduct of foreign affairs than between Roosevelt and Truman. Truman showed more spirit of American independence in his handling of foreign affairs than either Roosevelt or Eisenhower.

## Roosevelt and Eisenhower

**T**he motivations behind Roosevelt and Eisenhower may have been slightly different, but results have been about the same.

Roosevelt's gargantuan personal egotism started him on a self-appointed career as a 'world-



leader.' Being a socialist, he had no respect for the Constitutional principles on which the American republic was founded. Hence he was ever willing, if not eager, to scrap those principles in order to make any deal which would enlarge his operations as savior of the world. The only real obstacle to Roosevelt's ambition to become first President of the world was Joseph Stalin; but Roosevelt did not regard Stalin as an obstacle. He admired what Stalin was doing in Russia. Roosevelt possessed unusual political shrewdness, and was convinced that he had outstanding personal charm; but he seemed to sense that he could never match political shrewdness with Joseph Stalin. So, he set out to charm "old Joe."

Roosevelt's mission to woo Joe Stalin led America into World War II, gave Stalin all the fruits of victory, and created, for the post-war world, the most frightfully dangerous conditions the harassed world has ever known.

Eisenhower has an abundance of the same messiah complex which obsessed Roosevelt, although Eisenhower does seem less arrogant about it. Moreover, Eisenhower's objective does really seem to be "world peace."

**B**ut Eisenhower seems to have had the same conviction about his own personal charm that Roosevelt had. The one superlative quality he displayed during World War II was his ability to "handle people" — to compromise differences between antagonistic individuals and forces, to weld jarring and divergent personalities into harmonious teams.

Despite Roosevelt's tragic record of failure to charm the communists, Eisenhower seems to have felt — even as late as 1960 — that, if given enough opportunity to 'sit down and talk with the fellows in the Kremlin', he could smooth out all differences between them and us.

If Eisenhower's objectives seem a bit loftier than Roosevelt's were, his naivete is really less excusable, because the Roosevelt record was there for all the world to see, before Eisenhower set out to make the same mistakes that Roosevelt had made.

## Stalin-Roosevelt Correspondence

**I**t could be infinitely helpful to our country if future American presidents were compelled to journey through their tenure of office accompanied constantly by three volumes: the Constitution of the United States, the Holy Bible, and a well-documented outline of American History.

The volume of American history should certainly contain a sampling of the correspondence between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, during World War II.

**I**n 1957, the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow published two volumes of confidential correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill during the war years, 1941-1945. In 1958, E. P. Dutton and Company published the letters in one volume.

The letters reveal that Roosevelt, a dying man in 1945, had apparently come to sense some of the ghastly consequences of his vain attempts to charm Joe Stalin. Correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin just prior to Roosevelt's death shows that it was Stalin who gave the orders — sometimes with veiled politeness as if talking to an important subordinate, but often with open insolence — while Roosevelt either obeyed or "begged" Stalin to reconsider.

**O**n February 11, 1942 — while we were still gasping from the attack on Pearl Harbor, and while our forces in the Pacific were badly in need of supplies and equipment — Roosevelt wrote to Stalin:

"I realize the importance of getting our supplies to you at the earliest possible date and every effort is being made to get shipments off . . . .

"Although we are having our immediate troubles in the Far East, I believe that we will have that area reinforced in the near future to such an extent that we can stop the Japs, but we are prepared for some further setbacks."

In February, 1942, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin:

"My attention has just been called to the fact that the Soviet Government has placed requisitions with us for supplies and munitions of a value which will exceed the billion dollars which were placed at its disposal last autumn under the Lease-Lend Act following an exchange of letters between us. Therefore, I propose that under this same Act a second billion dollars be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. Should you have any counter suggestions to offer with regard to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be made available, you may be sure that careful and sympathetic consideration will be given them."

Stalin acknowledged the 'second-billion-dollar-loan in three months' with 'sincere gratitude,' and stated:

"I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that in using the loan extended to the USSR the appropriate Soviet agencies are encountering great difficulties as far as shipping the munitions and materials purchased in the USA is concerned."

He asked that the United States deliver munitions and convoy the ships to Soviet harbours.

On August 19, 1942, Roosevelt wrote Stalin:

"I well realize on the other hand that the real enemy of both our countries is Germany and that at the earliest possible moment it will be necessary for both our countries to bring our power and forces to bear against Hitler . . . .

"In the interim there will leave the United States for the Soviet Union during the month of August over 1,000 tanks, and at the same time other strategic materials are going forward, including aircraft. . . ."

In October, 1942, Stalin wrote Roosevelt:

"It would be very good if the USA could ensure the monthly delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminum, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million tons of grain (wheat) and as much

as we can have of fats, concentrated foods and canned meat. . . ."

Stalin ended this letter by asking for twenty or thirty more American ships to 'replenish the Soviet fleet.' Roosevelt replied to Stalin on October 16, 1942:

"I am glad to inform you, in response to your request, that the items involved can be made available. . . .

"I have given orders that no effort be spared to keep our routes fully supplied with ships and cargo in conformity with your desires as to priorities on our commitments to you."

On November 19, 1942, Roosevelt wrote Stalin:

"I am glad you have been so kind to General Hurley. As you can well recognize, I have a problem in persuading the people of Australia and New Zealand that the menace of Japan can be most effectively met by destroying the Nazis first. General Hurley will be able to tell them at first hand how you and Churchill and I are in complete agreement on this. . . ."

January 27, 1943: Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin:

"We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view of achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theater. At the same time we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and the Far East and sustain China and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theaters such as your *Maritime Provinces*.

"Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance in any case by every available route . . . .

"In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit the success in the general direction of Japan . . . . We shall not, however, allow our offensives against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every op-

portunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943 . . . . "

By October, 1943, the three heads of state were planning a conference. Churchill was willing to go anywhere. Stalin wanted the conference at Teheran.

On October 13, 1943, Roosevelt wrote Stalin: "The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The congress will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned (Teheran) is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled . . . .

"In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated. Asmara, the former Italian capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field . . . .

"Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship . . . . "

Stalin replied that he could not 'accept as suitable any of the places' Roosevelt suggested. It was Teheran or nothing.

On October 25th, Roosevelt tried again, telling Stalin:

"I am deeply disappointed . . . . I wish you would realize that there are . . . vital matters which, in our constitutional American Government, are my fixed obligations. These I cannot change . . . . I regret to say that, as the head of the nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where it is impossible to fulfill my obligations. . . .

"Were it not for this fact I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you . . . . I am begging you not to forget my great obligation to the American Government . . . . Please do not fail me in this crisis."

Stalin answered on November 5, 1943:

"I cannot but take into account the circumstances which you say prevent you from going to Teheran. It is for you alone, of course, to decide whether you can go there. . . ."

On November 8, 1943, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin:

"You will be glad to know that . . . . I have decided to go to Teheran and this makes me especially happy."

The war bled on.

Although President Roosevelt sent frequent congratulatory messages to Stalin praising the bravery of the Red Army and the nobility and sacrifice of the Russian people, and received replies from Stalin emphasizing the outstanding victories and accomplishments of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt mentioned the battle in the Pacific only casually, and Stalin never mentioned it at all.

A typical example was President Roosevelt's message to Marshal Joseph V. Stalin on July 21, 1944:

"My dear Marshal,

"Just as I was leaving on this trip to the Pacific, I received the very delightful framed photograph of you which I consider excellent. I am particularly happy to have it and very grateful to you.

"The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing and I wish much that I could visit you to see how you are able to maintain your communications and supplies to the advancing troops.

"We have taken the key island of Saipan after rather heavy losses and are at this moment engaged in the occupation of Guam. At the same time, we have just received news of the difficulties in Germany and especially at Hitler's headquarters. It is all to the good.

"With my very warm regards, I am . . . ."

The correspondence does not indicate that Mar-



shal Stalin ever expressed any interest in our victories and losses at Saipan and Guam.

**O**n February 10, 1945, President Roosevelt wrote Stalin:

"I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

"I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your view in reply to this letter."

**S**talin offered no objection — because, perhaps, he was sure enough of his own agents inside the American government to know that any plan to give America equality with the Soviet Union in the United Nations would never develop.

**R**oosevelt's final defeat at the hands of the Soviet dictator is evident from a series of letters which began when Roosevelt wrote Stalin on March 4, 1945:

"I have reliable information regarding the difficulties which are being encountered in collecting, supplying and evacuating American ex-prisoners of war and American aircraft crews who were stranded east of the Russian lines. It is urgently requested that instructions be issued authorizing ten American aircraft with American crews to operate between Poltava and places in Poland where American ex-prisoners of war and stranded airmen are located. This authority is

requested for the purpose of providing supplementary clothing, medical and food supplies for all American soldiers, to evacuate stranded aircraft crews and liberated prisoners of war, and especially to transfer the injured and sick to the American hospital at Poltava. I regard this request to be of the greatest importance not only for humanitarian reasons but also by reason of the intense interest of the American public in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war and stranded aircraft crews.

"Secondly, on the general matter of prisoners of war still in German hands, I feel that we ought to do something quickly. The number of these prisoners of war, Russian, British and United States, is very large. In view of your disapproval of the plan we submitted, what do you suggest instead?"

**S**talin replied on March 5, 1945:

"Your message of March 4 about prisoners of war received. I have again conferred with our local representatives in charge of this matter and can tell you the following:

"The difficulties which arose during the early stages of the speedy evacuation of American prisoners of war from the zones of direct military operations have decreased substantially. At present the special agency set up by the Soviet Government to take care of foreign prisoners of war has adequate personnel, transport facilities and food supplies, and whenever new groups of American prisoners of war are discovered steps are taken at once to help them and to evacuate them to assembly points for subsequent repatriation. According to the information available to the Soviet Government, there is now no accumulation of U.S. prisoners of war on Polish territory or in other areas liberated by the Red Army, because all of them, with the exception of individual sick men who are in hospital, have been sent to the assembly point in Odessa. . . .

"Hence, there is no need at the moment for U.S. planes to fly from Poltava to Polish territory in connection with U.S. prisoners of war."

**R**oosevelt wrote Stalin again on March 18:

"In the matter of evacuation of American ex-prisoners of war from Poland, I have been informed that the approval for General Deane to survey the United States prisoners of war situa-

tion in Poland has been withdrawn. You stated in your last message to me that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and to evacuate the sick.

"I have information that I consider positive and reliable that there are still a considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland and also that there have been, certainly up to the last few days and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American prisoners either at Soviet assembly points awaiting entrainment to Odessa or wandering about in small groups not in contact with Soviet authorities, looking for American contact officers.

"I cannot, in all frankness, understand your reluctance to permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Ambassador Harriman to explain to you in detail my desires."

**S**talin sent the following message to close this particular issue on March 22, 1945:

"With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting evacuation in Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odessa, there were only 17 sick U. S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 16. I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.

"With reference to the request contained in your message I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the given instance the matter concerns the interests of Soviet armies at the front and Soviet commanders who do not want to have around odd officers who, while having no relation to the military operations, need looking after, want all kinds

of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things that divert the attention of the commanders and their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to any extent. . . ."

**T**he matter was closed.

For four years, the American people had fed, clothed, and armed the Soviet nation at a cost exceeding ten billion dollars. MacArthur's forces in the Pacific had fought and died without adequate supplies because Russia's needs came first. Our leaders had used the vast wealth of our nation to keep the monstrous evil of nazism from destroying the monstrous evil of communism — and in the end, the communist dictator tells the President of the United States that we can not evacuate our American soldiers from eastern Europe, because Soviet commanders did not want to be bothered with having 'odd officers' of the American army underfoot, where they would 'need looking after from acts of German sabotage.'

Were there only seventeen sick American servicemen on Polish soil on March 16, 1945, as Stalin reported to Roosevelt? Obviously Roosevelt himself didn't believe it, and the American people will never believe it. But what did the American government, under the leadership of Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower, ever do to find out?

**T**he year 1960 would be an excellent time for Americans to demand answers to *many* unanswered questions. Leaders of both Republican and Democratic parties — equally responsible for betrayal of America — should be held accountable by Americans.

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